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Health Care Providers and
Fraud Investigations: What Can You Do
When the Government Changes the Rules
in the Middle of the Game?
Gordon E. Rountree, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION

In fiscal year 1997, the federal government collected $1.1 billion in criminal fines, civil judgments, and settlements as a result
of health care fraud enforcement efforts.' Health care providers
have good reason to feel pressured as the government continues
to increase2 its effort to recoup the estimated $100 billion lost
annually to health care fraud. Health care fraud has attracted
significant national attention since 1994 when Attorney General
Janet Reno identified it as the Department of Justice's highest
priority, behind violent crime. 4 From the perspective of providers, the situation is not expected to improve any time soon. On
January 23, 1998, President Clinton announced that his administration's fiscal 1999 budget would include ten new anti-fraud initiatives, including a plan to double the number of provider
audits conducted annually by the government.5
But has the government gone too far in its aggressive efforts
to investigate and prosecute those who commit health care
* Gordon E. Rountree, Jr., is an associate with the law firm of Sullivan, Stolier &
Resor, in New Orleans, Louisiana. He received his Bachelor of Arts from HampdenSydney College and his Juris Doctor, cum laude, from Tulane University, School of
Law, and his Master of Laws (Health Law) from Loyola University Chicago School of
Law. The author thanks Professor Joan Krause, of Loyola University Chicago School
of Law, for her editorial review and comments, and Mary Smith, administrative assistant of Sullivan, Stolier & Resor, for her valuable assistance during the editorial and
revision process.
1. See Kristen Hallam, Bragging Rights: Report Shows Fraud Probes are Paying
Big Dividends, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Feb. 2, 1998, at 8.
2. See Ursula Himali, Government Approach to Investigating Hospital False
Claims Varies by Initiative, 6 BNA's HEALTH L. REP. 1767 (Nov. 13, 1997).
3. See Alwyn Cassill, Cop: Federal FraudPolice Yourself or We'll Get You, AHA
NEWS, Feb. 3, 1997, at 1.
4. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEP'T OF JUSTICE HEALTH CARE FRAUD REPORT,
FISCAL YEAR 1994, Introduction § III(A)(1) (Mar. 2, 1995).

5.

See Clinton 10-Step Plan to Fight FraudIncludes Doubling of ProviderAudits, 7

BNA's HEALTH L. REP. 8 (Feb. 2, 1998).
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fraud? The government's recent fraud probes have not been directed at individual providers with questionable billing habits,
but rather at entire sectors of the health care industry, such as
Physicians at Teaching Hospitals ("PATH"), independent
clinical laboratories ("LabScam"), hospitals ("Transfer/Discharge" and "DRG Upcoding"), and hospital outpatient labs
("Operation Bad Bundle"). 6 Another probe, "Operation Restore Trust," is an example of a multi-prong attack on health
care fraud. This three-year-old initiative initially targeted fraud
in five states in the nursing home, home health, and durable
medical equipment industries. Due to its success, the initiative
was expanded in 1997 to include twelve additional states, and its
focus was broadened to include independent physiological labs,
psychiatric hospitals, and partial hospitalization.7 In addition to
catching providers who intentionally try to defraud the government, this dragnet approach is also bound to snare innocent or
confused providers, who may have valid justifications and defenses for their billing practices.
As a result of these new fraud initiatives, the government appears to have pursued national fraud investigations against
providers based on practices that the government had either explicitly approved of or tacitly accepted in years past." When this
happens, providers are put in a difficult position. A provider
may have billed and received payment from Medicare based
upon a fiscal intermediary's or carrier's advice (or silence) for a
number of years. When faced with allegations of billing fraud,
particularly a demand for penalties under the False Claims Act,
what is the provider to do?
This article addresses federal government health care fraud
investigations and focuses on the options available to those
health care providers being investigated because of practices instituted or continued as a result of implicit or explicit advice
from the federal government. Three possible provider re6.
7.

See Himali, supra note 2, at 1767-68.
See Administration Expands Health Fraud Effort to 12 More States, 6 BNA's
HEALTH L. REP. 807 (May 22, 1997); see also HCFA, Medical Savings Captured Under
Two-Year Project,IG Report Finds, 5 BNA's HEALTH L. REP. 1829 (Dec. 19, 1996);
see generally IG Launches Multi-Prong Attack in Fraud in Nursing Homes, Home
Health Agencies, 4 BNA's HEALTH L. REP. 718 (May 11, 1995).
8. See generally Lisa Scott, Hospitals Try to Devise Solutions in Device Debate,
MOD. HEALTHCARE, Feb. 20, 1995, at 34-5; see also False Claims: Fifteen Hospitals
Now Participatingin IG's Teaching Hospital Initiative, 5 BNA's HEALTH L. REP. 1829
(Dec. 19, 1996); see also Path Lawsuit Broadened, 7 BNA's HEALTH L. REP. 132 (Jan.
22, 1998).
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sponses include: (1) lobbying the government for relief; (2) suing the government; or (3) waiting to defend or settle a fraud
action. Part I of this article analyzes the potential for a successful lobbying effort, which may lead to a favorable change in governmental enforcement standards or the amicable settlement of
a specific investigation. Lobbying efforts were successful in the
Medicare coverage for investigational/experimental devices situation, and to a lesser extent in the partial settlement of the
PATH Audits. Part II of this article examines the pro-active
step of filing suit to enjoin the government from continuing a
fraud investigation, and the potential barriers to such a suit
posed by the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). Part III
of this article analyzes the typical response of waiting to defend
against a fraud suit and includes an analysis of some of the dispositive issues in a fraud action and the posture to be taken during an investigation. This article concludes with the
determination that the most successful of the three possible provider responses is an aggressive lobbying campaign.
I.

LOBBYING EFFORTS

Lobbying efforts on behalf of health care providers and their
trade associations are nothing new. However, these efforts intensified at the inception of Medicare's prospective payment
system in the 1980s and have continued to increase in light of
the government's recent fraud enforcement efforts. 9 For example, in the first six months of 1996, the American Medical Association ("AMA") spent $8.7 million on its lobbying efforts,
second only to the tobacco giant Phillip Morris. 10 Similarly, the
American Hospital Association ("AHA") increased its lobbying
efforts by seventy-four percent (to roughly $3.4 million) in the
first six months of 1997, compared to $1.95 million in the first six
months of 1996.11 Recently, in addition to their regular legislative agenda, health care providers have concentrated their lobbying efforts on reining in the government's anti-fraud
initiatives.
This new "anti-anti-fraud" lobbying effort developed as a result of what is viewed by some in the health care industry as the
9.

See Eric Weissenstein, Lobbying Legacy: AHA's D.C. Office Forever Changed

by Medicare PPS, MOD.

HEALTHCARE,

Jan. 26, 1998, at 64.

10. See Eric Weissenstein, Hefty Lobbying Expenditures Reported, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Oct. 7, 1996, at 60.
11. See Eric Weissenstein, Lobbying On the Rise: Budget Plan Leads Healthcare
Groups to Use Checkbooks, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Oct. 27, 1997, at 50.
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government's heavy-handed use of fraud investigations and enforcement. 12 This new lobbying effort has already been quite
active. In late 1997, the AHA appealed to Attorney General
Reno for a moratorium on any new fraud investigations.13 In
November 1997, the AHA created a fund to indemnify any hospital that agreed to act as a test case to fight federal fraud
charges in court, rather than settling.14 In December of 1997,
seventeen Texas lawmakers sent letters to the Department of
Health and Human Services ("HHS") Inspector General ("IG")
June Gibbs Browns, questioning that agency's use of the False
Claims Act to obtain onerous settlements from health care providers based on what could be characterized as unintentional billing errors.' 5 Also in the early stages of development is a new
coalition among health care providers, tentatively named the
"Health Care Accountability Partnership," whose goal is to
combat overly aggressive federal anti-fraud efforts. 16 Organizations that have reportedly shown interest in this new partnership
include the AHA, the AMA, the American Medical Group Association, and the Federation of American Health Systems.' 7 In
addition, the AHA has drafted an "anti-anti fraud" bill, which
was introduced in the House of Representatives in the spring of
1998. The bill is designed to limit the government's use of the
False Claims Act against providers in situations involving negligible amounts and honest billing mistakes.' 8
This increased pressure from the private sector has prompted
Attorney General Reno to defend her department's use of the
fraud statutes. In 1998, she stated that "[t]hese are not cases
where we are seeking to punish someone for honest billing misSee Eric Weissenstein, AHA's Theme: Scale Back Fraud Probes, MOD.
Feb. 9, 1998, at 26.
13. See Deanna Bellandi, AHA Calls for Fraud-ProbeRespite, MOD. HEALTHCARE, July 14, 1997, at 12.
14. See Eric Weissenstein, AHA Takes Up Gauntlet: Association Vows to Indemnify Hospitalthat Fights Feds, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Nov. 3, 1997, at 12.
15. See Eric Weissenstein, Still Trying to Rein in Feds: AHA Letters to Congress
Question Use of False Claims Act, Seek Legislative Relief, MOD. HEALTHCARE; Jan.
12, 1998, at 21.
16. See Eric Weissenstein, Efforts to Cool Fraud Probes Starts Slow, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Feb. 2, 1998, at 2-3.
17. See id. at 3.
18. See Health Care Claims Guidance Act, H.R. 3523, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998); see
also Weissenstein, supra note 12, at 26; Legislation Changing FCA to Ease Up on
Hospitals Introduced in House, 2 BNA's HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. 203-4 (Mar. 25,
1998). See generally discussion infra at pp. 10-17.
12.

HEALTHCARE,
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takes."' 19 She went on to assure the health care industry that the
Department of Justice would not use the False Claims Act to
prosecute mere billing "errors. ' 20 However, providers have
taken little comfort from her remarks.
The intensive lobbying efforts by the industry have yielded
positive results. Two successful lobbying efforts include the investigational medical devices controversy and, to a lesser extent,
the PATH audits. The investigational devices controversy resulted in the government modifying its policy by extending
Medicare coverage to a new class of medical devices. Although
the PATH lobbying effort continues, already it has resulted in an
easing of the fraud investigation for approximately one-third of
the teaching hospitals that had been subjected to the probe.
This section provides a deeper analysis of these two lobbying
efforts.
A.

Investigational Devices Lobbying Efforts

The quintessential example of a successful health care lobbying effort by providers facing a federal fraud initiative can be
seen in the investigational devices controversy in 1994 and 1995.
To understand this issue, it is necessary to have a basic familiarity with the underlying coverage dispute.
The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") regulates the
sale and classification of medical devices in the United States.
Certain medical devices that are life-sustaining or present a risk
of injury or illness to a patient, such as pacemakers and replacement heart valves, require FDA approval before they can be
marketed legally.2 '
The Medicare program is a government sponsored health insurance program that provides medical benefits for the aged and
disabled. 22 Medicare is administered by the Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA"), which contracts with regional insurance companies (known as "fiscal intermediaries"
and "carriers") to administer the Medicare program on HCFA's
behalf.23 In 1977, HCFA responded to inquiries concerning
Medicare reimbursement for certain medical devices lacking
19.
BNA's
20.
21.
22.
23.

See Reno Defends False Claims Act Use; AHA Seeks Changes in Use of Law, 7
HEALTH L. REP. 204 (Feb. 5, 1998).
See id.
See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d) (1998).
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395b-2-1395b-3 (1998).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395h (1998).
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FDA marketing approval. HCFA sent letters to the Medicare
contractors instructing them to make coverage determinations
for these devices on a case-by-case basis.24 Intermediaries were
instructed that coverage for these investigational/experimental
devices should be provided if the particular device's usage was
generally accepted in the local medical community.25 In general,
hospitals purchase these devices from manufacturers; they are
then implanted into a patient during surgery. Thus, hospitals experience a financial loss if Medicare reimbursement is precluded. The hospitals (rather than physicians) were the parties
involved in this reimbursement dispute.
Medicare contractors continued to make reimbursement determinations on a case-by-case basis from 1977 to 1986. In 1986,
however, HCFA amended its instructions. For the first time, it
explicitly tied investigational device reimbursement to the FDA
approval process. This 1986 Hospital Manual amendment excluded Medicare reimbursement for investigational devices that
had yet to receive FDA marketing approval. 26 However, hospitals continued to actively seek reimbursement for these nonFDA-approved devices. More often than not, these devices
were simply new generations of older FDA-approved devices.
They were actually safer and more effective than the original
devices, but had yet to complete the lengthy FDA approval process. Despite the 1986 amendment, many fiscal intermediaries
continued to make individual coverage determinations on a
case-by-case basis between 1986 and 1994.27 Thus, hospitals regularly received reimbursement for these non-FDA-approved
28
medical devices during this period.
In June 1994, the government began a nationwide investigation of 130 hospitals that had received Medicare reimbursement,
primarily for non-FDA-approved investigational cardiac devices
between 1986 and 1994.9 In its defense, the hospital industry
argued that there had been considerable confusion regarding
24.
25.
26.
27.
1996),
28.
29.

See Part A Intermediary Letter No. 77-4, Part B Intermediary Letter No. 77-5.
See id.
See 1986 MEDICARE HOSPITAL MANUAL § 260.1.
See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 939 F. Supp. 1457, 1462 (C.D. Cal.
on remand to 125 F.3d 765 (9th Cir. 1997).
See id.
See Whistleblower Lawsuit Reveals Hospitals Accused of False Billing, 4 BNA's
HEALTH L. REp. 1362 (Sept. 14, 1995); see also David Burda, Hospitals Served Subpoenas in Probe Over Medical Devices, MOD. HEALTHCARE, June 20, 1994, at 4;
David Burda, AHA Warns Hospitals of HHS Probe, MOD. HEALTHCARE, June 27,
1994, at 4.
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Medicare reimbursement for these investigational devices.30

Many hospitals argued that the government's agent, the fiscal
intermediaries, had implicitly covered such devices by continuing to reimburse hospitals for the previous eight years. Therefore, because

of their good

faith reliance

on the fiscal

intermediaries, the hospitals argued that they should not be exposed to any fraud liability. Not surprisingly, the massive fraud
investigation began to have a chilling effect on the hospital industry, causing many well-known facilities to stop clinical trials
involving investigational devices. 3 '
In response, the trade associations representing the hospitals
and other health care providers united and appealed to Congress. They argued that the real victims of this fraud probe were
the Medicare beneficiaries, who would be denied access to the
latest technology as a result of HCFA's change in policy. In January 1995, a coalition of over thirty powerful organizations, including the AMA and the AHA, began a letter-writing
campaign to members of Congress, pleading for Medicare coverage for investigational devices and an end to the ongoing
fraud investigation.3 2 In May 1995, several California hospitals
joined together and filed suit against Donna Shalala, the Secretary of HHS, in an effort to enjoin the ongoing fraud investigation.3 3 In June 1995, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) introduced
a bill in the Senate aimed at reversing HCFA's 1994 decision to
crack down on Medicare payments for non-FDA-approved investigational devices.34 A similar bill was also introduced in the
House by Congressman William Thomas (R-Calif.). 3 5
The vigorous lobbying effort resulted in HCFA's announcement in September 1995 that it would change its policy regarding investigational devices.3 6 The new policy provided
30. See Lisa Scott, HHS Probe Stirs Device Controversy, MOD. HEALTHCARE, July
11, 1994, at 54.
31. See Lisa Scott, NY HospitalStops Clinical Trials, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Feb. 6,
1995, at 24.
32. See Scott, supra note 8, at 38.
33. See Cedars-Sinai,939 F. Supp. at 1459.
34. See Advanced Medical Devices Access Assurance Act of 1995, S. 955, 104th
Cong. § 2 (1995).
35. See Advanced Medical Device Access Assurance Act of 1995, H.R. 1744,
104th Cong. § 2 (1995).
36. See Criteria and Procedures for Extending Coverage to Certain Devices and
Related Services, 60 Fed. Reg. 48,417 (1995) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts 405 & 411);
Reimbursement HCFA Adopts Final Rule Authorizing Paymentfor CertainNew Medical Devices, 4 BNA's HEALTH L. REP. 1424 (Sept. 21, 1995); Lisa Scott, Providers
Win Device-Payment Fight, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Sept. 18, 1995, at 17.
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reimbursement for updated versions of legally marketed, FDAapproved medical devices used in clinical trials, but continued to
exclude first-of-a-kind devices that have yet to receive FDA approval.37 The FDA implemented a new categorization process
to assist HCFA in coverage determinations. Under this new process, the FDA classified devices according to their experimental
status: "experimental/investigational" (Category A) devices and
"non-experimental/investigational" (Category B) devices. Category A devices are excluded from Medicare coverage, while
Category B devices may be covered on a case-by-case basis by
the fiscal intermediaries.38 The HCFA policy reversal resulted
in relief for hospitals subjected to the investigational devices
fraud probe and was viewed as a victory for the providers that
had been lobbying for the change.
B.

PATH Audits Lobbying Efforts

The PATH audits provide another example of the government
revising a fraud initiative as a result of vigorous lobbying efforts
by the health care community. Although the result in the PATH
context has not been a complete victory for providers, several
hospitals have been shielded from federal liability arising from
the fraud probe. To appreciate the lobbying efforts involved, it
is important to have a basic understanding of the underlying
dispute.
Generally, Medicare Part A reimburses hospitals for inpatient
services rendered to Medicare beneficiaries, while Medicare
Part B reimburses physicians for services rendered to these beneficiaries.39 Private insurance companies, known as Medicare
carriers, have contracted to administer Medicare Part B
throughout the country on behalf of HCFA. 4° Teaching hospitals may bill Medicare Part B for certain services rendered to
Medicare beneficiaries by attending teaching physicians. 4 1
However, a medical service performed by an intern alone is not
separately billable to Medicare Part B, but is considered to be
37. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.201-209 (1998); Particular Services Excluded From Coverage, 42 C.F.R. § 411.15 (1998); Criteria for Determining that a Provider, Practitioner, or Supplier Knew that Services were Excluded from Coverage as Custodial
Care or as Not Reasonable and Necessary, 42 C.F.R. § 411.406 (1998).
38. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.201 (1998).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395k(a) (1998).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395u (1998).
41. See 42 C.F.R. § 415.172; BNA's HEALTH L. & Bus. PORTFOLIO SERIES
§ 1600.03.
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included in the teaching hospital's reimbursement under Part
A.

42

In 1969, HCFA established criteria whereby a teaching hospital could bill Medicare Part B for an attending physician's services when the services were actually performed by an intern, as
long as that intern was under the "general supervision" of the
attending physician.43 This policy, enunciated in HCFA Intermediary Letter No. 372, created a vague standard that did not
appear to require for reimbursement purposes the physical pres44
ence of an attending physician to supervise an intern's actions.
In 1992, HCFA amended this policy to state that a service would
not be covered unless the attending physician was actually present when the medical service was rendered.45 Although HCFA
viewed this as a clarification, providers saw this as a complete
revision of the prior regulations. Some of the Medicare Part B
carriers did not issue clear guidance to their providers concerning HCFA's clarification.46 In December 1995, HCFA issued a
final rule stating that an attending physician must "direct the
care from such proximity as to constitute immediate availability," in other words be "physically present," at the administration of medical services in order to bill Medicare Part B. 47 The
new rule clarified the issue and eliminated the coverage criteria
set forth in the 1969 intermediary letter.
In May 1996, the Medicare Carriers Manual was revised to
alert teaching hospitals to this change in policy. 48 A month
later, the HHS Office of Inspector General ("OIG") announced
plans to investigate and audit the billing practices of all 125 academic medical institutions in the nation, an initiative that became known as Physicians at Teaching Hospitals.49 Under
PATH, however, the government sought to retroactively hold
the teaching hospitals accountable for the new standard. The
42. See Services of Residents in Approved GME Programs, 42 C.F.R. § 415.200
(1998).
43. See I.L. 372 (1969); Services of Attending Physicians Supervising Interns and
Residents, 42 C.F.R. § 405.521(b)(4) (1991), superseded by 42 C.F.R. §§ 415.110415.190 (1998).
44. See BNA's HEALTH L. & Bus. PORTFOLIO SERIES § 1600:0302.
45. See Health Care Financing Memorandum FQA-541 (Dec. 30, 1992).
46. See BNA's HEALTH L. & Bus. PORTFOLIO SERIES § 1600:0303.
47. See 42 C.F.R. § 415.174 (1998).
48. MEDICARE CARRIER'S MANUAL, HCFA Pub. 14, Part 3, § 15016 (May 30,
1996).
49. See Physician Payment: IG to Audit All HospitalAcademic Institutions Under
PATH, Officials Say, 5 BNA's HEALTH L. REP. 30, at dll (July 25, 1996).
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government's rationale was that the December 1995 amendment
was a mere "clarification" of the government's policy, and that
teaching hospitals had notice of the standard since 1992.
A lobbying effort led by the Association of American Medical
Colleges ("AAMC") and the Association of Academic Health
Centers quickly mobilized against this new fraud investigation. °
In early 1996, the two associations sent letters to HHS Secretary
Shalala urging the government to exercise restraint in the audits,
arguing that the OIG was arbitrarily applying, retroactively to
1990, guidelines that did not go into effect until mid-1996.51
During the first six months of 1997, roughly fifty lawmakers, including Senators and Congressmen from both parties, sent letters to Secretary Shalala expressing their concern regarding the
PATH initiative, and arguing that HHS was unfairly attempting
to retroactively apply the "present physician" standard.52
On July 11, 1997, the government announced that it would
drop sixteen of the forty-nine PATH audits underway at the
time. The majority of hospitals dropped from the audits were
located in New England, where the regional Medicare carrier
had not thoroughly explained the reimbursement rules to the
hospitals.5 3 The HHS General Counsel noted that "the standards for paying teaching physicians under Part B of Medicare
have not been consistently and clearly articulated by HCFA
over a period of decades. '54 The OIG revised its guidelines concerning the PATH audits to provide that an audit would only be
conducted where the Medicare carrier issued clear explanations
before December 30, 1992, regarding the rules for reimbursement for the services of teaching physicians. Similarly, the OIG
agreed not to initiate a new audit until it obtained carrier materials showing that clear instructions regarding reimbursement
were given to the teaching physicians concerning the "physically
present" standard.
50. See Restore Trust/PATH Initiatives, 6 BNA's HEALTH L. REP. 219 (Feb. 6,
1997).
51. See id. at 220.
52. See CongressionalOpposition Mounts to HHS IG's Teaching Hospital Audits,
1 BNA's HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. 445-46 (July 16, 1997).
53. See Deanna Bellandi, Off the Hook: HHS Drops 16 PATH Audits, Cites Unclear Billing Guidance, MOD. HEALTHCARE, July 21, 1997, at 12; see also Ursula
Himali, HHS Backs Off Anti-FraudInitiative, DroppingAudits of 16 Teaching Hospitals, 1 BNA's HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. 442-43 (July 16, 1997).
54. See Bellandi, supra note 53, at 12.
55. See Himali, supra note 53, at 442.
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Because only sixteen teaching hospitals were dropped from
the investigation, the initial lobbying efforts clearly were not a
complete victory for the teaching hospitals, and these efforts
continued. On October 21, 1997, the Labor, Health and Human
Services, and Education Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee held a hearing addressing the OIG's nationwide PATH initiative. At that hearing, AAMC President Jordan
Cohen pleaded with lawmakers to suspend the remaining PATH
audits, arguing that the facilities should not be held to standards
that were not clearly articulated. 6 Additionally, Representative
Bill Thomas (R-Calif.) called for the General Accounting Office
("GAO"), the investigative arm of Congress, to report on the
PATH audits.57 Subsequently, the full House voted for the
GAO to conduct the audit of the PATH investigations. The
GAO's report, released on July 23, 1998, reviewed the OIG's
legal authority to investigate the PATH situation and the OIG's
approach to and methodology for conducting the audits.58
The GAO report concluded that the OIG had the authority
under the False Claims Act to investigate teaching hospitals'
Medicare billing for services provided by interns and attendings,
but it vigorously criticized the OIG's investigative techniques.59
The GAO questioned the OIG's intent to audit every major
teaching hospital and suggested that the OIG adopt a new approach to determine which facilities to audit so that it could
more wisely focus its resources. 60 The GAO also determined
that the OIG exaggerated the extent of the billing problems uncovered at several teaching hospitals.
While these lobbying efforts were underway, on October 29,
1997, several major teaching hospitals and medical associations
had grown impatient with the progress on the lobbying front.
They filed suit against Secretary Shalala in the federal district
court in Los Angeles seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
The suit was dismissed in April 1998. The district court held
that the case was not ripe because the plaintiffs failed to comply
56.
57.

See Path Hearings, 6 BNA's HEALTH L. REP. 1665 (Oct. 30, 1997).
See Jonathan Gardner, House Panel Urges Halt to PATH Probes, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, July 28, 1997, at 12; see also GAO May Review Use of FCA, 7 BNA's
HEALTH L. REP. 248 (Feb. 12, 1998).
58. See Gardner, supra note 57, at 12; see generally GAO Reviews PATH Audits, 7
BNA's HEALTH L. REP. 131 (Jan. 22, 1998).
59. See WILLIAM J. SCANLON, MEDICARE CONCERNS WITH PHYSICIANS AT
TEACHING HOSPITALS (PATH) AUDITS, GAO/HEHS Doc. No. 98-174, at 1-28
(1998).
60. See id.
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with the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 6 1 The case is
currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
While the PATH audit controversy continues, a bill introduced into the House in March 1998 may affect the outcome of
the PATH audits as well as many other governmental fraud investigations. Representatives Bill McCollum (R-Florida) and
Bill Delahunt (D-Mass.) introduced "The Health Care Claims
Guidance Act," aimed at amending the civil False Claims Act
("FCA").6 2 If passed, this bill would preclude the government
from prosecuting health care providers for honest billing mistakes, and potentially decrease the overall activity in health care
fraud enforcement. 63 The bill, which was backed by the American Hospital Association, has forty-seven co-sponsors. The
AHA and the bill's supporters have argued that the government
is abusing the civil FCA in order to fight fraud and abuse. AHA
president Dick Davidson stated, "Under the Justice Department's tactics hospitals and health systems are presumed guilty
until proven innocent."' He also noted that "[m]ost Medicare
billing errors are due to conflicting, complex governmental regu'65
lations covering Medicare.
The current form of the bill imposes a de minimis standard on
Medicare overpayments. If the overpayment is less than a certain percentage (to be determined by HHS) of the provider's
total Medicare reimbursement, the provider is liable only for the
amount of the overpayment plus interest, without additional
penalties. Moreover, providers who rely upon fiscal intermediary or carrier advice are liable only for the overpayment plus
interest. The bill also raises the burden of proof under the FCA
from a preponderance of the evidence standard to a clear and
convincing evidence standard. 66 Additionally, facilities that installed an effective corporate compliance program would reduce
their potential exposure under the civil FCA, facing only actual
61. See Association of Am. Med. Colleges, et al. v. United States, No. CV-9801734-CM (C.D. Calif.) dismissed July 9, 1998; see also California Dismisses Lawsuit
Seeking to End PATH Audits, BNA's HEALTH CARE DAILY, Apr. 30, 1998; section
III, infra.
62. See H.R. 3523; see also Legislation Changing FCA to Ease Up on Hospitals
Introduced in House, 2 BNA's HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. 203-04 (Mar. 25, 1998).
63. See H.R. 3523.
64. See Legislation Changing FCA to Ease Up on Hospitals Introduced in House,
supra note 62, at 203.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 204.
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damages plus interest, rather than treble damages plus $5,000 to
$10,000 per claim.67
On June 3, 1998, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") issued a
guidance to all of its field attorneys concerning the application
of the FCA against health care providers.68 The guidance was
issued as a result of the intense lobbying effort against the DOJ
usage of the FCA concerning the PATH and other nationwide
fraud initiatives. The threatened passage of the Health Care
Claims Guidance Act may have played a role in the issuance of
the DOJ's guidance.
The DOJ guidance was issued to promote consistent enforcement of the FCA and to avoid a rigid approach that fails to recognize the particular facts and circumstances of an individual
case. 69 The guidance directs Assistant United States Attorneys
to evaluate whether the provider (1) submitted false claims to
the government, and (2) knew its claims were false. 70 Assistant
United States Attorneys are instructed to conduct a multi-step
analysis before alleging an FCA violation. On the first step they
are to: examine relevant statutory guidance; verify the accuracy
of the data and evidence; and conduct an investigation. On the
second they are to: consider whether the provider had been
given prior notice concerning the illegality of its practices; consider the clarity of the underlying reimbursement rule or policy;
weigh the magnitude and pervasiveness of the false claims; consider mitigating factors and compliance plans; consider any prior
remedial efforts; analyze the guidance issued by the government
or its agents (i.e. intermediaries, carriers); consider prior audits;
and consider other information on provider's "state of mind."71
The June 3, 1998, guidance was viewed as a step in the right
direction by the health care industry. It resulted in an easing of
congressional pressure concerning the Health Care Claims Guidance Act.72 One of the bill's co-sponsors, Rep. William Dela67. See id.
68. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FALSE CLAIMS ACT GUIDANCE, JUNE 3, 1998.
Text available in 4 BNA's HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. 459 (June 17, 1998). During
the same week, the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector
General issued similar guidelines concerning the False Claims Act as it applies to
health care providers.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id at 459-60.
72. See McCollum Moves Forward with False Claims Bill Despite Co-Sponsor's
Withdrawal, 2 BNA's HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. 438-39 (June 17, 1998).
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hunt, withdrew his support as a direct result of the guidance.73
While the bill is still pending, its demise is highly likely; nevertheless, its introduction illustrates the power of the health care
industry in Washington.
II.

FILING SUIT AGAINST

THE GOVERNMENT

Faced with a potential investigation of practices they previously believed were permissible, some health care providers
have chosen to sue the federal government to enjoin the fraud
investigation. This measure may be viewed as a form of collateral attack against the government's use of the fraud and abuse
laws, independent of continuing lobbying efforts. Often these
providers grow frustrated with the progress on the lobbying
front, and instead seek a quick judicial resolution to the invasive
fraud probe.
For example, while the investigational devices controversy
was playing out in Washington in May 1995, twenty-five California hospitals, led by Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, sued HHS
Secretary Shalala seeking to enjoin her department's investigational devices fraud probe.74 Similarly, in October 1997, the Association of American Medical Colleges sued to enjoin the
ongoing PATH investigations. The suit was dismissed by the district court, and is currently pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit.7
In addition, in October 1996 the Ohio Hospital
Association and the AHA filed suit against Secretary Shalala,
seeking to enjoin a fraud investigation targeting alleged laboratory billing abuses, known as the Ohio Hospital Project. 76 Generally, these suits have not succeeded, largely due to barriers
posed by the APA, which requires parties to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing a lawsuit. In general, lobbying efforts appear to have produced a better outcome for
providers than the lawsuits filed against the government.
The idea of providers suing the Secretary of HHS to enjoin a
governmental action is not new. In the 1980s, the AHA brought
several suits against the Secretary seeking to enjoin actions that
adversely affected provider reimbursement.77 These suits dealt
73. See id.
74. See Cedars-Sinai,939 F. Supp. at 1459.
75. See Association of Am. Med. Colleges, CV-98-01734-CM (C.D. Calif.), dismissed July 9, 1998; appeal docketed, No. 98-56190 (9th Cir. July 17, 1998).
76. See Ohio Hosp. Ass'n v. Shalala, 978 F. Supp. 735, 736 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
77. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 170, 172 (7th Cir. 1983);
American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1987); American
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with issues such as the Hill-Burton Act, the peer review organization program, the Medicare secondary payer provisions, and
the medical malpractice premium reimbursement issue. These
cases achieved only moderate success, again largely due to the
barriers posed by the APA. Although a discussion of the specific issues involved in these lawsuits is beyond the scope of this
article, these cases are instructive in that the analysis applied to
present-day suits is the same as applied to these cases from the
1980s.
These provider-initiated suits often turn on the courts' interpretation and application of the APA. The APA requires an
agency to publish proposed rules and allow for a period of public consideration and comment. 78 However, this notice and comment period requirement applies only to substantive rules. An
agency does not have to comply with the notice and comment
procedure when issuing "interpretive rules, general statements
of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice ..... "79 Generally, HCFA's policy revisions, manual updates,
intermediary letters and directives have been viewed as interpretive rules, and therefore not subject to challenge on the
ground that the agency failed to comply with notice and comment procedures. 80
A.

Cedars-Sinai (InvestigationalDevices) Suit

The Cedars-Sinaicase challenging the investigational devices
fraud probe resulted in a victory for the California hospitals at
the district court level. 8' The hospitals sued in May 1995, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the investigational devices initiative. They alleged that the 1986
Medicare manual revision, which denied Medicare reimbursement for non-FDA-approved investigational devices, was unlawful because it was not promulgated in accordance with the rulemaking requirements of the APA. The hospitals sought to invalidate the 1986 policy revision and to enjoin the Secretary from
Hosp. Ass'n v. Sullivan, No. 88-2027, 1990 WL 274639, at *1 (D.D.C., May 24, 1990);
Hadley Mem. Hosp., Inc., v. Schweiker, 689 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1982).
78. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (1998).
79. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1998).
80. See Shalala v. Guernsey Mem. Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995); Shalala v. St.
Paul-Ramsey Med. Ctr., 50 F.3d 522, 527 n.4 (8th Cir. 1995); National Med. Enter. v.
Shalala, 43 F.3d 691, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
81.

See Cedars-Sinai, 939 F. Supp. at 1457.
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enforcing the amended policy, putting an end to the fraud
probes.82
The trial court invalidated the 1986 HCFA revision after finding that it was a substantive rule and not promulgated in accordance with the requirements of the APA. The court reasoned
that the 1986 revision withdrew coverage for a benefit that had
been previously provided, that is, coverage of investigational devices. The revision created a new coverage exclusion, changing
the existing rules and affecting beneficiaries' rights. Therefore,
the 1986 amendment was a substantive rule subject to the notice
and comment period.83 Because HCFA admitted that it did not
comply with the notice and comment requirement, the court
ruled in favor of the hospitals and invalidated the 1986 coverage
exclusion. In April 1996, the court issued a declaratory judgment and an injunction, effectively halting the ongoing investigation in that district. 84
However, the providers' victory was short-lived. In September 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined to affirm the district court's holding and remanded
the entire case. 85 On appeal, the Secretary argued that the hospitals' claims were barred by the six-year statute of limitations;
that is, although the amendment was made in 1986, the hospitals
did not bring suit until 1995.86 Further, she argued that the general six-year time period for commencing an action against the
United States applied to judicial review of agency regulations
under the APA.87 The hospitals responded that their action did
not accrue until 1994, when the Secretary began the investigational devices fraud probe. The Ninth Circuit declined to address the underlying merits, and instead remanded the entire
case for a factual determination on the statute of limitations issue. 88 As of the date of this writing, the district court has not
ruled on the case since being remanded.

82. See Cedars-Sinai, 939 F. Supp. at 1459.
83. See id. at 1465.
84. See id.
85. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Shalala v. Qui Tam Relator, 125 F.3d 765 (9th
Cir. 1997).
86. See id. at 769.
87. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a); Wind River Min. Corp. v. United States, 946
F.2d 710, 713 (9th Cir. 1991).
88. See Cedars-Sinai, 125 F.3d at 771.
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Ohio Hospital Association (Lab Bundling) Suit

A suit by several Ohio hospitals has been even less successful
than the Cedars-Sinaicase. The Ohio case was prompted by the
"Ohio Hospital Project" billing probe, a cooperative effort between state and federal enforcement authorities seeking to identify false claims resulting from billing for hospital clinical
laboratory tests.8 9 The probe, which began in June 1995, sought
to identify instances where a laboratory "unbundled" the billing
of the tests it performed. 90 Generally, Medicare reimbursement
is greater if a lab bills individually for tests performed than if it
bills for pre-established groups or "bundles" of tests. This process is known as "unbundling." The government argued that
certain tests should have been bundled together, which would
have resulted in lower Medicare reimbursement rates. 91 In response, the hospitals argued that they were never instructed on
certain bundling requirements and on other requirements, they
were not informed until June 1994, and that the government was
unfairly applying the bundling requirement retroactively to
1989. 92 The providers argued they had no indication they were
doing anything wrong, particularly because the regional Medicare intermediary regularly reimbursed them for these unbundled test bills.93
In October 1996, the Ohio Hospital Association, along with
the AHA, filed suit seeking injunctive and declaratory relief
against the billing probe. 94 They also sought a declaratory judgment ruling that the hospitals could not be held liable under the
False Claims Act for these billings. However, the district court
held that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case because the
providers had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as
required by the Medicare Act.95
Generally, courts are wary of lawsuits in which the parties
have not gone through the entire administrative process estab89. See Eight More Ohio Hospitals Settle Alleged False Claims for Lab Tests, 5
BNA's HEALTH L. REP. 1828 (Dec. 19, 1996).
90. See Five Ohio Hospitals Pay $2.3 Million to Settle Lab Billing FraudAllegations, 5 BNA's HEALTH L. REP. 1054 (July 11, 1996).
91. See id.
92. See AHA, Ohio Hospitals Sue Government to Stop False Claims Act 'Abuse,' 5
BNA's HEALTH L. REP. 1479 (Oct. 10, 1996).
93. See id.
94. Ohio Hosp. Ass'n, 978 F. Supp. at 736.
95. See id. at 742.
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lished by the relevant statute. 96 The Social Security Act explicitly provides that:
No findings of fact or decision of the [Secretary] shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided. No action against the United States,
the [Secretary], or any officer or employee thereof shall be
brought under section 1331 or 1346 of Title 28 to recover on
any claim arising under [the Medicare Act] ....97
"Any individual, after any final decision of the [Secretary] made
after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the
amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by
a civil action ....98 Courts have held that a claim arising under
the Medicare Act cannot be heard in federal court until the Secretary reaches a final decision on the issue. 99 Applying this principle, the district court refused to extend equitable jurisdiction
to the providers, holding that this dispute arose under the Medicare Act and that the Secretary had yet to reach a final decision
on the matter.'a°
However, the district court sympathized with the providers'
plight, and characterized the Secretary's approach in this investigation as "heavy-handed.''0 The court suggested that the providers might eventually obtain judicial review by "calling the
Secretary's bluff" and refusing to settle, thereby allowing a jury
to decide whether the defendants had the requisite mental state
to support a fraud conviction. 10 2 The court acknowledged that
this route to judicial review is "extremely onerous," stating that
"despite the very real possibility that the Secretary's position regarding the hospital's billing practices is wrong, the practical
barriers of challenging the Secretary leave the hospital with little
choice and no bargaining room.' 10 3 In December 101997,
the
4
providers filed an appeal, which has yet to be heard.
In general, these provider-initiated cases have not gained any
relief for the health care providers under investigation. Often
96. See, e.g., Public Citizen. Health Res. Group v. Commissioner FDA, 740 F.2d
21, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1998) (made applicable to Medicare disputes by Social
Security Act § 1872, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii (1998)).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1998).
99. See, e.g., Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 605 (1984).
100. See Ohio Hosp. Ass'n, 978 F. Supp. at 741.
101. See id. at 742.
102. See id; see also infra, part III.
103.

Ohio Hosp. Ass'n, 978 F. Supp. at 742.

104. See Ohio Hosp. Ass'n v. Shalala, No. 97-4217 (appealfiled Dec. 29, 1997).
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they are regarded as a mere symbolic gesture by the industry, a
futile attempt to halt what is viewed as an unfair interpretation
and enforcement action. As demonstrated by the PATH and investigational devices disputes, providers achieve much more
success when they lobby the government.
III.

WAIT AND SEE:

DEFENDING A FRAUD SUIT

The option of last resort for a health care provider facing a
fraud investigation is to remain in a defensive posture and litigate any resulting fraud action. As the judge in the Ohio Hospital Association case acknowledged, this is an onerous route to
judicial review, 10 5 but often it is the only option available. This
route can be treacherous to the health care provider. The potential liability is tremendous if the government successfully
proves its case. Penalties for fraudulent activities include monetary damages, exclusion from federal health care programs, state
licensure sanctions, and sanctions for misdemeanor and felony
convictions, including imprisonment. 106 Because the potential liability may be too great for many health care providers, they
may be forced to settle, even when the providers believe they
did nothing wrong.
The highly regulated environment of the health care industry
can lead to multiple interpretations of the thousands of regulations governing provider reimbursement, as seen in the PATH
audits, the investigational devices dispute, and the lab test bundling disputes previously discussed. These conflicting interpretations often go to the heart of the dispute; therefore, it is not
surprising that the fact finder's intent determination is frequently the dispositive issue in a fraud action. 10 7 Thus, fraud
on the government's ability to prove
prosecutions usually turn
10 8
intent.
provider's
the
As a former prosecutor, this author would like to make a few
recommendations to health care providers facing a fraud investigation and potential indictment. The posture taken by a potential defendant should be an aggressive one, and the provider
should try to keep open a line of communication with the prose105. See Ohio Hosp. Ass'n, 978 F. Supp. at 742.
106. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1998); 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1998); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a7b(a) (1998); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1998).
107. See Scienter is Key in Defending Accusations of FCA Violations, 1 BNA's
HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. 315-16 (May 21, 1997).
108. See id.
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cutor. Take any available opportunity to argue the merits of the
case to that individual. Try to convince the prosecutor that he is
wasting his time, and that the potential defendant was simply
relying upon a reasonable interpretation of a complex regulation or governmental communication when he submitted the
claims. Similarly, a provider would be well-advised to build a
case file, and perhaps even conduct its own investigation to document support for the practices. Did the carrier or intermediary
make any communications that could be used to justify the provider's billing practices? Was every other provider in the region
billing in the same manner?
Finally, the provider should present all favorable evidence to
the investigating official or potential prosecutor before indictment. Do not hold anything back. It is much easier for a defendant to obtain a favorable result early in the investigation
and screening phases, as opposed to later in the process. The
criminal justice system tends to gather momentum as it progresses, especially after indictment. The provider should attempt to convince the prosecutor that his time would be better
served going after another provider who clearly committed
fraud. The provider may argue that, due to its reasonable reliance upon a valid interpretation of a complex or ambiguous regulation, it lacked the requisite mental state for a conviction.
The following is an analysis of the fraud statutes most often
employed by the government in the prosecution of health care
providers. Specifically, this section will analyze the False Claims
Act (both civil and criminal), the Federal Healthcare Programs
Fraud Act, and the False Statements Act. 10 9 Particular attention
will be given to the applicable knowledge requirement of each
statute, because this element is often disputed in health care
fraud prosecutions.
A.

The Civil False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. §§ 3129-3130)

To prosecute civil fraud, the government primarily uses the
civil False Claims Act ("FCA"). 110 The FCA has become one of
the major enforcement tools used against health care fraud today. The FCA was originally enacted during the Civil War to
prevent the government from being defrauded by defense con109. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1998); 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1998); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)
(1998); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1998).
110. See 132 CONG. REC. H9382-03 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Glickman).
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tractors."' The original FCA was amended in 1872 to separate
the civil and criminal provisions.' 1 2 The civil act was substantially revised in 1986, when Congress lowered the standard for
proving intent and increased the penalties and damages provisions. 113 Until the early to mid-1990s, the FCA was primarily
used against defense contractors. Because of the heightened enforcement of health care fraud, the majority of cases concerning
the FCA are now in the area of health care fraud." 4
The civil FCA prohibits any person from knowingly presenting or causing to be presented to an officer or employee of the
government a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval." 5 The damages provisions attached to this statute are
quite substantial. They include a mandatory penalty of not less
than $5,000 and not more than $10,000 per false claim submitted, which can add up very quickly. The act also provides for
treble damages for the injury sustained by the government as a
result of the false claim submitted. 116 For example, if a lab billed
Medicare for several individual laboratory tests when the regulations mandate bundling of the tests, each fraudulent claim
filed could be subject to a $5,000 to $10,000 fine. If the laboratory submitted ten such claims a day, over ten days the statutory
penalty alone could be as much as $1 million. These damages
provisions are so onerous that many providers cannot risk losing
a trial. More often than not, the FCA is used by the government
to convince providers to settle.
1.

"Knowingly" requirement

The civil FCA has always required a showing that the defendant's actions were undertaken knowingly, although this requirement was not defined prior to 1986.117 In the 1986 amendments,
Congress defined "knowingly" to mean that a person "(1) has
actual knowledge of the information; (2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (3) acts in
111. See United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 722 F.
Supp. 607, 609 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
112. See JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND Qui TAM ACnONS 1-13 (5th
ed. Supp. 1998).
113. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1998).
114. See Four of Five Top Qui Tam Recoveries in 1996 in Health Care Industry,
Group Says, 1 BNA's HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. 122-23 (Feb. 26, 1997).
115. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1998).
116. See id.
117. See id.
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reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information,
and
118
no proof of specific intent to defraud is required.
Although the knowledge requirement may have been lowered, the government must still make an affirmative showing of
some intent. It is important to note that the FCA was not intended to hold someone liable for a mere "innocent mistake,"
1 19
but is instead concerned with ferreting out "wrongdoing.'
The knowledge element is a subjective question of fact, the resolution of which can often lead to unpredictable results at trial,
depending upon the fact finder's analysis of the evidence and
interpretation of the statute.12 0 However, the case law does provide some guidance as to how courts have dealt with this
standard.
One case that is instructive is United States v. Krizek.12 1 In
Krizek, the government contended that a certain CPT (reimbursement) code used by the defendant psychiatrist required
forty-five to fifty minutes of "face to face" contact with the patient. 122 The defendant testified that it was his impression that
the fifty-minute requirement included physician preparation and
staff consulting time, resulting in only perhaps twenty minutes of
"face to face" time. The defendant presented credible experts
who testified that his usage and interpretation of the CPT code
was common practice among psychiatrists in the Washington,
D.C., area. The court found that the CPT code itself did not use
the specific term "face to face" and that the requirement was
ambiguous. Thus, the Court found that "the government's position on this issue is not rational and has been applied in an unfair manner in the medical community . . 123 The Court
refused to impose FCA liability based upon such a "strained interpretation" of CPT codes, and found that the government's
theory of liability was plainly unfair and unjustified. 2 4 Krizek
118. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (1998).
119. See Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1420 (9th Cir.
1992).
120. See United States v. Shah, 44 F.3d 285, 294 (5th Cir. 1995); United States ex
rel. Haskins v. Omega Inst., Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 555, 566 (D. N.J. 1998); Plywood
Prop. Assoc. v. National Flood Ins. Program, 928 F. Supp. 500, 512 (D. N.J. 1996).
121. United States v. Krizek, 859 F. Supp. 5 (D.D.C. 1994), affid in part and remanded, 111 F.3d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
122. See id. at 9.
123. Id. at 10.
124. See id. It should be noted that Dr. Krizek was ultimately found liable under
the FCA; the court held that Dr. Krizek acted in "reckless disregard of the truth or
falsity of the information" by failing to supervise his assistants' billing procedures.
For example, he allowed his subordinates to assume that he spent a full fifty minutes
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stands for the proposition that there should be no civil FCA liability when the law or regulatory guidance is vague or ambiguous, and the provider acted reasonably and was unaware of the
government's interpretation of the law.
Providers defending against a FCA action should vigorously
litigate the knowledge element. They might successfully defend
a FCA suit if the government relied on an irrational interpretation of a reimbursement regulation or rule that was never communicated to the provider. The government might have
difficulty showing that a defendant knowingly submitted false
claims if the underlying reimbursement policy was ambiguous or
ill-defined, as in Krizek.
2.

Presented or caused to be presented a claim for payment
or approval to an officer or employee of the
United States

The second element of a civil FCA violation is that the defendant presented or caused to be presented a claim for payment or approval to an officer or employee of the United States
Government. 125 The act defines a claim as "any request or demand, whether under contract or otherwise, for money or property which is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient if
the United States Government provides any portion of the
money or property which is requested or demanded ....
126
There are few reported cases addressing this "claim
presented" element of the FCA. Courts typically look to the
plain language of the underlying statute or authority for which
the defendant seeks payment to determine whether a claim has
been presented. 127 In a health care fraud case, whether the provider presented a claim for payment, such as a Medicare bill, is a
factual determination.
The second element is the submission "to an officer or employee of the United States Government."' 28 Clearly, whether
the provider billed the government is also a factual determination. The government can prevail on a FCA violation even
though a third party (i.e., the regional fiscal intermediary or caron each patient's case (the most lucrative CPT) unless he stated otherwise, never
reviewed bills, and often billed for twenty hours of work in a twenty-four-hour day.

He was found liable for these sloppy procedures.
125. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1998).
126.
127.
128.

Id. at § 3729(c) (1998).
See, e.g., United States v. Truong, 860 F. Supp. 1137, 1140 (E.D. La. 1994).
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1998).
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rier) actually received, administered and paid the claims submitted by the defendant.12 9 Typically, federal courts hold that the
federal government is the real party in interest when such a false
claim is submitted to a contractor because federal funds ultimately pay for the submitted claims. 130 Therefore, providers
have little chance of success in arguing that they only submitted
a claim for payment to the fiscal intermediary and not directly to
the federal government.
3.

Claim is false or fraudulent

The third and final element of the FCA requires that the
claim must be "false or fraudulent.' 131 The majority of cases in
this area involve the submission of claims that are egregiously
false, such as when a physician seeks reimbursement for a service that was never performed. 132 Another common example of
false claims is DRG or CPT "upcoding," where a physician bills
Medicare or Medicaid for a more serious procedure than actually performed, resulting in excessive reimbursement. 33 Falsification of Medicare or Medicaid cost reports is also common. 34
To determine whether a claim is false often requires an objective
analysis of the evidence presented at trial. For example, a claim
is clearly false if a physician bills Medicare for an office visit that
never took place.
B.

Criminal False Claims Act (18 U.S.C. § 287)

Because the elements of the civil and criminal FCA are basically the same, courts liberally apply precedent governing one
statute to cases arising under the other. 135 Additionally, if the
government is successful in obtaining a criminal conviction, the
129. See, e.g., Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1975).
130. See id. at 51-52.
131. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1998).
132. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physicians Servs., No. 9735395, 1998 WL 707761, at *1 (9th Cir. Wash. Sept. 22, 1998); United States ex rel.
Lacorte v. SmithklineBeecham Clinical Lab., Inc., 149 F.3d 227, 231 (3d Cir. 1998);
United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899,
900 (5th Cir. 1998).
133. See Krizek, 859 F. Supp. at 7.
134. See United States v. Simon, 510 F. Supp. 232, 233-34 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
135. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1943).
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the
defendant is then collaterally estopped from re-litigating
1 36
substantive issues in a subsequent civil FCA action.
The criminal False Claims Act was enacted at the same time
as the civil False Claims Act and has essentially the same elements. 137 The only difference is that in the criminal statute requires a more culpable mental state. For example, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently upheld the
following jury instruction for a criminal FCA violation:
"knowingly" "means that the act was done voluntarily and intentionally and not because of mistake or accident." "Willfully" or "willingly" was defined to "mean that the act was
committed voluntarily and purposely, with the specific intent
to do something the law forbids-that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law."' 38
Not all circuits require that such a high level of intent be
proved for a criminal FCA conviction. For example, some circuits have endorsed a conscious avoidance jury instruction. 139 In
United States v. Nazon, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the use of140a
conscious avoidance or deliberate ignorance jury instruction.
Dr. Nazon was convicted of criminal FCA violations because he
billed Medicaid for the services of physician assistants who were
not present during procedures, and impermissibly billed for lab
tests he did not perform. At trial, Dr. Nazon testified that he
had never read the Medicaid provider manual, and that he simply had billed what he thought he deserved. 141 The Seventh Circuit upheld his conviction, holding that the conscious avoidance
jury instruction was proper in that case because the defendant
deliberately avoided familiarizing himself with the rules and
conditions of the Medicaid program. 4 2 The jury was able to infer the defendant's guilty knowledge from the surrounding facts
and circumstances, including the fact that Nazon had been told
repeatedly that he was billing incorrectly. The trial court instructed the jury that "[i]f you find that a person had a strong
suspicion that things were not what they seemed or that some136. See United States v. Thomas, 709 F.2d 968, 972 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488, 495-96 (1997) (bank fraud case discussing when
dual prosecution under criminal and civil statutes constitutes double jeopardy).
137. See 18 U.S.C. § 287; see also United States v. Okoronkwo, 46 F.3d 426, 430
(5th Cir. 1995) (showing elements in tax fraud case).
138. United States v. Upton, 91 F.3d 677, 683 (5th Cir. 1996).
139. See United States v. Nazon, 940 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir. 1991) (Manion, J.).
140. See id. at 259.
141. See id. at 257.
142. See id. at 260.
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one had withheld some important facts, yet shut his eyes for fear
of what he would learn, you may conclude that he acted 'knowingly' . .

.,4

Because the intent requirement of the criminal statute requires a higher level of knowledge than the civil statute, the government will have greater difficulty proving a provider's
culpability if the government relies on a questionable and perhaps even retroactive application of a reimbursement rule or
regulation. This was arguably the case in the PATH audits, laboratory bundling disputes, and investigational devices disputes.
C.

The Medicare and Medicaid Fraud Statute
(42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a))

The Medicare and Medicaid Fraud Act, enacted in 1977, is
intended to punish providers for false statements they make in
connection with applications for payment under any federally
funded health care program. 144 While the civil or criminal FCA
and the False Statements Act 145 are intended to protect the integrity and fiscal soundness of all government programs, the
Medicare and Medicaid Fraud Act is intended to protect against
fraud only in federal health care programs. 146 Surprisingly,
there are few reported cases involving this statute. Instead, federal prosecutors appear to have used traditional fraud statutes,
such as the FCA and the False Statements Act, to prosecute
Medicare and Medicaid fraud. The Medicare and Medicaid
fraud statute contains three elements: (1) knowingly and willfully; (2) making or causing to be made a false statement or representation of material fact; and (3) in147 a claim for payment
under any federal health care program.
1. Knowingly and willfully
Unlike the civil FCA, the knowledge element of this statute is
defined as "knowingly and willfully."'1 48 Courts have interpreted
143. Id. at 258.
144. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (1998). The Medicare/Medicaid False Statements Act was passed at the same time as the subsection directly preceding, the AntiKickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a7b[b], another statute often used by the government in fraud enforcement.
145. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1998); see also infra section 11I(D).
146. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(1) (1998).
147. See id.; see also United States v. Laughlin, 26 F.3d 1523, 1526-27 (10th Cir.
1994).
148. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(1) (1998).
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this language to mean that the government must prove the defendant made a false material representation in an application
for a benefit, and that the defendant actually knew at that time
that the claim or representation he was submitting was false. 49
United States v. Laughlin provides a helpful illustration of the
knowledge requirement. Dr. Laughlin was a physician who
fraudulently billed Oklahoma Medicaid both for procedures
performed and for procedures he did not perform. The Tenth
Circuit reversed Laughlin's fifty-two count conviction under 42
U.S.C. section 1320a-7b(a)(1), because the jury was improperly
instructed. 50 The court held that the jury instruction was insufficient because it failed to inform the jury that the "statement
must not only be false but that Dr. Laughlin must also have
known that the statement was false when the claim was submit'
ted."151
This standard holds the government to a higher level of
proof, in which the government must prove that the defendant
knew he was violating the rules of the program.
Another example of such a case is United States v. Larm.5 2
Dr. Larm was convicted of billing Hawaii Medicaid for physician "office visits," although he personally neither saw the patients nor rendered services. 53 Additionally, Larm frequently
upcoded and billed for more extensive services than were actually performed. As in Laughlin, the Larm court held that the
government must prove that the defendant specifically knew he
was making a false statement or representation in application
for payment. 154 Unlike in Laughlin, however, the government
in Larm had objective evidence indicating Larm's knowledge.
Significantly, Larm twice had been told by a representative of
the carrier that he was using the wrong codes. The court also
emphasized the fact that the two codes Larm was manipulating
were specifically defined. They were listed on the same page in
the Medicaid Manual, which had been provided to Larm. The
court also relied on the warnings and the availability of the correct information from the Medicaid Manual to demonstrate

149. See Laughlin, 26 F.3d at 1526; see also United States v. Larm, 824 F.2d 780,
783 (9th Cir. 1987).
150. See Laughlin, 26 F.3d at 1529.
151. Id. at 1526 (emphasis added).
152. See Larm, 824 F.2d at 780.
153. See id. at 782.
154. See id. at 783.
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Larm's knowledge; as a result, the court affirmed the
conviction. 155
Therefore, it appears that the Medicare and Medicaid fraud
statute requires the government to prove that the defendant
knew he was unlawfully billing Medicare. This burden of proof
may be difficult for the government to meet if applied to any of
the factual scenarios discussed in detail in this article. For example, if the government fails to notify providers of the proper lab
test bundling rules, the government may subsequently have difficulty proving that a provider knowingly violated those rules.
The same would be true if the government attempted to hold
the teaching hospitals retroactively liable under the "present
physician" standard when the providers were never informed of
the policy change. "
2.

Making or causing to be made a false statement or
representation of material fact

The second element of the Medicare and Medicaid fraud statute is making or causing to be made a false statement or representation of material fact. 156 Much of the case law under this
statute has addressed the knowledge element. However, the reported cases have been silent regarding the other elements, including this "materiality" requirement. In cases involving similar
fraud statutes, the Supreme Court has held that the materiality
requirement is a mixed determination of law and fact for a jury
to decide. 57 In determining whether a statement or representation is material, the key issue is whether the statement has "a
natural tendency to influence" a determination by the other
party. 158 For example, coding information (i.e., CPT or DRG
codes) included in a Medicare bill would likely be deemed a material representation, because the information has a natural tendency to influence the Medicare carrier or fiscal intermediary
either to pay the bill or to deny reimbursement.

155.
156.
157.
was for
was for
158.

See id. at 780.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(1) (1998); see also Laughlin, 26 F.3d at 1528.
See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 512 (1995). Gaudin's conviction
a violation of the False Statements Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Specifically, this
false statements made in applications for federally funded mortgages.
United States v. Brown, 763 F.2d 984, 993 (8th Cir. 1985).

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol8/iss1/4

28

1999]

3.

Rountree:
Care
Providers andand
FraudFraud
Investigations:
What Can You Do W
HealthHealth
Care
Providers
Investigations

125

Claim is made to a federally funded health care program

The third element under this statute is that a claim for payment be made under a federal health care program. 159 Any
health care program that is funded in part by federal funds qualifies as a federal health care program. Such programs include
Medicare, Medicaid and CHAMPUS. This element is easily
established.
D.

The False Statements Act (18 U.S.C. § 1001)

Unlike the Medicare and Medicaid fraud statute, the False
Statements Act is intended to prevent fraud in all government
programs, not just in health care programs. However, the two
statutes have similar elements, including the same intent requirement (knowingly and willfully) and a requirement that the
false representation be material. 60 The False Statement Act
was originally passed in 1863 as part of the original FCA. The
statute is a wide-reaching prohibition against government fraud,
and the courts have interpreted its language broadly. As the
Fifth Circuit explained, "[t]he false statement statute is necessarily couched in very broad terms to encompass the variety of deceptive practices which ingenious individuals might perpetrate
upon an increasingly complex government.' 16 1 The elements of
the False Statements Act are (1) knowingly and willfully; (2)
making a false statement, concealing a material fact, or using a
writing or document that is false in a material matter; and (3) in
any matter within the62jurisdiction of any department or agency
of the United States.
1.

Knowingly and willfully

The False Statements Act requires that the defendant acted
knowingly and willfully. 163 Most courts require a showing that
the defendant acted "with knowledge" when he or she made the
false statement or representation. This means that there must
be some evidence that the defendant knew the statement was
false at the time it was made. 164 However, some courts have
159.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(1) (1998).

160.
161.
162.
163.

See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1998); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(1) (1998).
See United States v. Massey, 550 F.2d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1977).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1998).
Id.

164.

See, e.g., United States v. Markham, 537 F.2d 187, 194 (5th Cir. 1976) (case

concerning patent concealment).
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held that the intent required to commit this crime may be
proved by evidence of conscious avoidance or reckless disregard
in learning of the truth, thus allowing analogies to be drawn to
the intent required under the civil FCA. 165 For example, the
Fifth Circuit has held that a conviction requires proof that the
defendant had the specific intent to make a false or fraudulent
representation "deliberately or at least with reckless disregard
1 66
of the truth and with the purpose to avoid learning the truth.'
This is somewhat surprising in light of the fact that the statute
reads "knowingly and willfully." Although the language in the
False Statements Act is similar, the Medicare fraud statute requires a more culpable mental state.
Federal circuit courts have affirmed the use of the conscious
avoidance and reckless disregard standard in False Statements
Act cases. 1 67 For example, in United States v. Evans, the defendants were convicted for submitting fraudulent Medicare
claims. 168 The defendants owned a medical services supply company. While leasing equipment to Medicare beneficiaries, the
defendants had the patients sign blank Medicare reimbursement
forms. During the course of the lease, the company filled out
the signed blank forms for services beyond the lease agreement
and submitted those claims for reimbursement, even though no
actual additional services were rendered. The appellate court
affirmed Evans' conviction, holding that "[t]he misrepresentation must have been made deliberately, knowingly, and willfully,
or at least with reckless disregard of the truth
and with a con'1 69
scious purpose to avoid learning the truth.'
Under this approach, the knowledge required for a violation
under the False Statements Act is very similar to the standard
required under the civil FCA. The government must produce
evidence that shows the defendant acted in reckless disregard of
the truth. Evans clearly violated the Medicare provider regulations by having beneficiaries sign blank forms and billing for
services not rendered. It is important to note that in this case
the government had facts to prove the defendant's knowledge.
However, in the fraud scenarios previously discussed, the gov165. See United States v. Puente, 982 F.3d 156, 159 (5th Cir. 1993).
166. See id. (quoting United States v. Tamargo, 637 F.2d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 824, 102 S.Ct. 112, 70 L.Ed.2d 98 (1981)).
167. See United States v. Evans, 559 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1977).
168. See id.
169. Id. at 246 (quoting United States v. Lange, 528 F.2d 1280, 1288 (5 Cir.
1976)).
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ernment may fall short in showing that any of the providers acted in reckless disregard of the truth, because the "truth" was
ambiguous and standards were not clearly communicated to the
provider.
Making a false statement, concealing a material fact, or
using a writing or document that is false in a
material matter
The second element of the False Statements Act is the making
of a false statement, concealing a material fact, or using a writing or document that is false in a material way. 170 The portion of
this element that would most concern a health care provider defending a fraud action would be the "making" of a false material
statement or writing. A provider may argue that the Medicare
bills submitted were not clearly "false" because the government's policy was ambiguous and ill-defined. Such an argument
could be made, for example, in the PATH situation or the lab
test bundling scenario. Courts have held that, if it is difficult to
determine whether the statements were false, the "government
[has] the burden to allege and prove that the statements were
false under any reasonable interpretation.' 17 1 In light of the tremendous confusion surrounding these rules and regulations, the
government may have difficulty proving that a provider's interpretation was unreasonable.
Additionally, the false statement must be a material representation. As discussed above, the Supreme Court recently held
that the question of materiality is a mixed question of law and
fact that should be put to the jury. 1 72 If the information in question has "a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of affecting or influencing, a government function," then such a
representation would be material. 73 Thus, representations
made in a Medicare bill should be deemed material if they affect
the decision of the carrier to pay the claim.
2.

3. In any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States
The third and final element of the False Statements Act is that
the false statement must be made in a manner within the juris170.
171.
172.
173.

See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1998).
United States v. Adler, 623 F.2d 1287, 1289 (8th Cir. 1980).
See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 512.
United States v. Swaim, 757 F.2d 1530, 1534 (5th Cir. 1985).
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diction of a department or agency of the United States. 74 This
language has been construed broadly by the federal courts, and
the phrase has been given a "non-technical meaning in order to
accomplish the purpose of the statute.' 1 75 Courts also have held
that as long as the money used came from federal funds, the
false statement will be considered within the jurisdiction of a
department or agency of the United States. 76 It need not be
proved that the defendant knew federal monies were involved.
Therefore, it should not be difficult for the government to establish this element of the False Statements Act, as long as any portion of the questionable claims was paid with federal money.
CONCLUSION

The increased governmental scrutiny of alleged "fraud and
abuse" by health care providers has dramatically changed the
environment of the health care industry. It has become commonplace for the government to launch nationwide investigations of entire sectors of the health care industry. Providers
often feel that they will be coerced into multi-million dollar settlements by the government's threatened use of the FCA, a
cause of action that a provider cannot afford to lose at trial.
This situation has left providers in a quandary about what they
can do to avoid an unfavorable outcome. In many cases, providers may believe that their billing practices have been lawful and
have been sanctioned by the government and its agents for
years.
A few providers have begun to combat what they feel is the
government's illogical interpretation of the law and heavyhanded use of the fraud statutes. The options available for such
a provider are lobbying for a governmental policy change, suing
the government to enjoin the unjustified enforcement, or sitting
back and eventually defending against a fraud action. As
demonstrated by the cases discussed above, the most successful
option appears to be an aggressive lobbying campaign, which
may lead to a favorable result for the investigated provider, and
perhaps the entire industry.

174. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1998).
175. Massey, 550 F.2d at 305.
176. See United States v. Baker, 626 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1980).
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